International Community, The U.S. and the Prospects for an Iranian Nuclear Program
Uluslararası Toplum, ABD ve İran Nükleer Programının Görünümü

Majid Rafizadeh*

Özet:


Anahtar kelimeler; kadın tarihi- toplumsal hareket- devlet- bazı teorileri- orta Doğu- toplumsal hareket.

Abstract

One of the key issues regarding globalization and international controversies is Iran’s nuclear program. This subject has been addressed by two core constituents: one is state actors such as the United States, England, Russia, China and France, the second is non-state actor; the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Several policies have been enforced ranging from diplomatic negotiations to economic sanctions. Notwithstanding the policies, Iran proceeds with its uranium enrichment activities and there has not been a consensus in the global sphere for a comprehensive

* Research Assistant.; Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars - USA

History Studies
ABD ve Büyük Ortadoğu İlişkileri Özel Sayısı/ Relationships of the USA and The Great Middle East Special Issue 2011
resolution. This paper seeks to investigate the endeavors and attitudes of state and non-state actors in approaching this agenda and facet of globalization. Hence, the first part of the paper will briefly give an overall history of Iran’s nuclear program and the fundamental motivations behind it. The second part will concentrate on the positions and actions which state and non-state actors have taken towards Iran’s nuclear program. Finally it will extrapolate the result to the new world and current globalization. In conclusion, it will reveal the fragile aspect of globalization in resolving the conflict and arriving at consensus in this global arena.

**Keywords:** Women history, Social Movement, State, Western Theories, Middle East, Social Movement

**Introduction**

Iran’s investment in nuclear technology started as early as the late 1950’s. In order to solidify relations, the U.S. and Iran signed the Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Civil Uses of Atoms in 1957 after 2 years of negotiations.\(^1\) In 1959, the Shah ordered the establishment of the Nuclear Research Centre at Tehran University. In 1967 Iran purchased a five megawatt research reactor from the United States for the Amirabad Technical College in Tehran.\(^2\) And in 1960s hundreds of students were sent to western countries and the United States to master technological fields.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was opened to signature in July 1968 after 10 years of negotiations and Iran became one of the first signatories of the NPT; the Majlis ratified the treaty in February 1970 and it entered into force in March 1970.\(^3\) In 1974, the Shah established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and in a historic announcement in March 1974, he declared the plan of establishing 23 nuclear power plants by 1994. In 1975, Iran bought a 10 per cent share in Eurodif, a joint French, Belgian, Spanish and Italian uranium enrichment company.\(^4\) Then, in 1976 Iran and Germany reached an agreement to

---


\(^3\) Declassified US documents indicate that the US-supplied nuclear material contained 5.545 kilograms of enriched uranium, of which 5.165 kilograms were fissile isotopes, and 112 grams of plutonium of which 104 grams were fissile isotopes as well as minute quantities (0.9 grams) of Pu-238. The documents also indicate that all the enriched uranium and plutonium for the research reactor has been irradiated and none of these materials have been returned to the US or retransferred to another country. See ‘US Supplied Nuclear Material to Iran, September 1967 to May 1976’, Non-Classified, Chart State, DNSA (Item Number IR03551), Washington, 29 Jan. 1980, p.1.

\(^4\) Negotiations of the NPT evolved gradually from the prolonged and unsuccessful negotiations on the general and complete disarmament of the 1950s. Already in 1956 it was suggested that measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons could be made part of a wider disarmament package. Such measures were seen as a possible supplement to a test ban treaty. As the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban dragged out and ran into trouble because of superpower disagreement on the issue of inspections, there was an increasing awareness of the need for other non-proliferation measures. The first constructive political initiatives that were taken to address this situation were a row of proposals submitted by Ireland to the UN General Assembly and other UN organs, beginning in 1958 and resulting in the adoption of the Irish Resolution by a unanimous vote on 4 Dec. 1961. The essence of the resolution was that the nuclear weapon powers should undertake not to transfer nuclear weapons to other states and that the existing non-nuclear-weapons states should voluntarily forgo their right to make nuclear weapons. The main idea was to prevent nuclear anarchy through the establishment of an international treaty that would be subject to inspection and control. But, in spite of the resolution and
build six nuclear power reactors, the first two of which were to be established in Bushehr. On February 1978, all nuclear activities came to halt as a result of the revolution and was afterwards followed by eight years of the Iran-Iraq war.

Although Khomeini’s revolutionary slogan was “na sharq, na gharb, faghat jomhoory eslami” “ no west, no east, just Islamic Republic [ of Iran]’ and he also advocated anti-modernization involving anything related to the West; nuclear projects were no exception. The post-revolution energy crises and the first four years of the Iraq-Iran war shocked the clerics into comprehension of the value of energy production and military technology, though some of Khomeini’s supporter claim that he believed weapon of mass destruction are “immoral”.

In the early 1980s, after president Rafsanjani got Khomeini’s approval to go ahead with the nuclear program, he started negotiations with France and Germany. While both countries refused to assist in Iran’s nuclear energy program, Iran turned to countries such as Spain, Argentina, Pakistan, China, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia. In 1987, Iran signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with Pakistan. In 1991, China and Iran made an agreement to provide Iran with a 20 MW research reactors from China. By the late 1980’s Russia had agreed to cooperate in the nuclear field. In the early 1990s, the U.S. imposed sanctions when Iran intensified its attempts to expand the range of its nuclear program. However, the Clinton Administration’s “dual containment” policy was not highly welcomed by the European countries due to a lack of evidence that Iran was planning to build nuclear weapons. On 14 August 2002, the U.S. Office of the National Council of Resistance of Iran revealed in a Washington D.C. press conference the existence of top secret Iranian nuclear projects, specifically the uranium enrichment facility in Natanz and the heavy water production facility in Arak. Following on an IAEA resolution, in February 2006 Iran’s file was directed to the United Nations Security Council. Several factors should be considered regarding Iran’s motivations and ambitions to obtain nuclear power in the global and regional arena.

---

in spite of the fact that a new negotiating forum was set up at the end of 1961 by the United States and the Soviet Union, and endorsed by the United Nations, there was no real progress in talks on a non-proliferation treaty until well into 1965. There seem to have been many causes of this lack of progress. First, the US administration apparently pursued several lines of policy whose objectives were seemingly incompatible. Second, the members of the North Atlantic Alliance were more and more divided among themselves, with France more and more following its own direction. Third, the Federal Republic of Germany feared that eventual arms control and disarmament agreements would involve far-reaching settlements in Europe and have negative repercussions on German reunification. Finally the first years of the Kennedy Administration saw a deterioration of East–West relations, with the Soviet insistence on a peace settlement in Europe such as the erection of the Berlin Wall, the unsuccessful US invasion of Cuba, and the American engagement in Vietnam. In addition, 1963–64 saw a change of political leadership at the highest level in both the United States and the Soviet Union. However, detonation 240 M. Kbaro_glu Downloaded By: [University of California, Santa Barbara] At: 02:49 4 June 2010 of a nuclear device by the People's Republic of China prompted the two superpowers to quickly resolve their differences and work out the final text of the treaty soon after. See C.M. Roberts, *The Nuclear Years: The Arms Race and Arms Control, 1945–70* (New York and London: Praeger Publishers, 1970), 68–9.

Both countries have stressed that the reactor was intended solely for peaceful purposes, and Iran agreed to allow IAEA safeguards. See the website of Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) of the Centre for Non-proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in Monterey, CA, USA, available online at http://www.nti.org/db/china/ncsorg.htm.

---

First, domestic threats. Given the widespread discontent among Iranian citizens, the theocratic state desired to strengthen its own security at home and weaken its opponents both abroad and domestically. By having nuclear power, it could easily ignore international laws considering violations of human rights and suppression of domestic politics at home.

Second, foreign threats: nuclear capability was a credible deterrence for the Iranian clerics against foreign threats, especially since Iran was surrounded by four major nuclear powers. Nuclear capability could change Iran into a major regional (i.e., Middle Eastern) and global actor. As Shahram Chubin highlights, "nuclear power is said to give Iran entry into an exclusive club." 7

Third, ideological reasons, specifically prestige and pride were a factor. As Hans Morgenthau has commented, for both prestige and deterrence purposes nations attempts “to impress other nations with the power one’s own nation actually possess, or with the power it believes, or wants the other nations to believe, it possesses.” Iran sought to be respected in the region and the world as a key actor. The constituent elements of the Iranian regime’s political psychology were a combination of assertive nationalism and a sense of humiliated national pride. Iran has a history of a proud civilization that dates back more than 2,500 years. Although the majority of the Iranian public is against the current government policies, they believe that they should have the right to obtain nuclear power. As a result, both the supporters and opponents to the government have given significant support to continue nuclear technology efforts; a situation that can be compared to Iranian attitudes toward oil nationalization in 1951.

Fourth; economic hegemony: Iran is the second largest oil producer in OPEC and according to Oil and Gas Journal, as of January 2010, Iran’s estimated proven natural gas reserves stand at 1,045 trillion cubic feet (Tcf), second only to Russia’s, and still half of its fields are not developed. It has 14% of world’s oil and 18% of world’s natural gas. However, it imports nearly 40% of its gasoline, mainly from neighboring Gulf States. 8 Nuclear energy can assist Iran to be more independent economically and increase its hegemonic role by expanding oil and gas exports.

Since the Iranian Revolution, the United States has been consistently concerned and occasionally hostile to Iran’s nuclear aspirations. Beginning with the Revolution and accompanying hostage crisis in 1978, the Reagan Administration scrutinized the export of nuclear equipment to Iran, even intervening to German cooperation with Iran. 9 During the 1990s, President Bill Clinton banned U.S. companies from investing in Iran's oil industry. 10 In addition, Iran’s continuation of a nuclear development program led to sanctions by the United States in 1990s. As noted above, during the 1990s the Bush and Clinton administrations applied a “dual containment” policy. However, with the election of moderate Seyed Mohammad Khātamī as the Iranian president in 1997, “dual containment” changed to a “limited rapprochement” policy. This situation

The main confrontation over Iran’s nuclear program began when it was confirmed that Iran was hiding nuclear enrichment facilities in two cities; Natanz and Arak. U.S. officials made it clear that Iran has violated Article II of the NP treaty by maintaining the two clandestine locations. This U.S. officials claimed revealed their intention to produce nuclear weapons and as a result, they claimed that Iran had also violated Article IV. Consequently, Iran should not be entitled to pursue uranium enrichment. This led Iranian leaders to invoke Article IV and argue that nothing in the Non-Proliferation Treaty should affect the inalienable right of the member states to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and they flatly reject the U.S. request to stop enriching uranium.11 Moreover, Iranian leaders reported, and the IAEA certified, that not notifying the Agency about the Natanz and Arak’s nuclear plants was just a ‘failure’ rather than a ‘violation’ of Iran’s safeguards obligations and nothing in the NPT states that they had to inform IAEA. They further add that the failure to inform IAEA was due to time constraints. Also, Iranian leaders stated that even if they had notified IAEA, the U.S. would have prevented them from finalizing the project.12 However, to remove suspicion, Iran invited IAEA inspectors to control the sites. Iranian leadership received a report, in November 2003, from the IAEA that it did not find any evidence for nuclear arms activities. However, the difficulty was that while the advanced state of these facilities might be used for peaceful purposes, they might also be used to produce weapons-grade fissile material such as highly enriched uranium and plutonium that are necessary for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Additionally, other documents revealed Iran’s intention of obtaining nuclear missiles, but Iranian officials claimed that these documents were forgeries.

Still, American officials remained unconvinced that Iran’s claim that it was interested solely in producing nuclear electrical power plants, in large part because they believed that Iran did not need nuclear energy because of its oil and gas resources. Vice President Richard Cheney, like Dr. Henry Kissinger, changed his mind about the Iranian nuclear program after Iranian Revolution stated, “The Iranians are already sitting on an awful lot of oil and gas. Nobody can figure [out] why they need nuclear [power] as well to generate energy.”

On the other hand, the U.S has asserted several causes for believing that Iran’s ultimate objective to build nuclear weapons. First, Iran concealed its nuclear program for eighteen years. Second, Iran did not disclose to IAEA all uranium enrichment facilities in the country. Third, IAEA inspectors found traces of highly enriched uranium far above the level needed for civilian usage. Fourth, Iran was also building the infrastructure for nuclear weapons production. Fifth, if Iran made nuclear weapons, they might fall into terrorist hands and threaten the United States and

---

11 See Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions from a Historical Perspective and the Attitude of the West,” Middle Eastern Studies 43(2), 223-245.

12 Conversations with Iranian officials and scholars on the sidelines of the conferences in Tehran in March 2005 and in Ankara in Jan. 2006, none of whom wished to be identified.
other countries. Finally as Dr. Henry Kissinger pointed out, Iran is not an ally and it has been hostile to the U.S.

For their part, however, Iranian officials use different justifications. First, they ask why other countries which have not signed the NPT and possess nuclear weapons, or, are nearing completion of nuclear energy projects, have not been subjected to similar accusations. Secondly, they claim that it is not reasonable to question Iran because, according to the NPT treaty, if Iran had not signed the NPT, which was voluntary, it had the right to obtain nuclear weapons, hence, other countries should respect Iran’s voluntary participation in NPT and peaceful nuclear activities. Third, although the Shah was clearly stating in some speeches that he needed to have nuclear weapons, the new government declared that it needs the nuclear energy to generate electricity, so why did western countries support Iran before the revolution but oppose it now? Iranian leaders have frequently reiterated Iran’s peaceful purposes for enriching uranium. President Ahmadinejad stated “a cultured, learned, rational, and civilized’ nation such as Iran ‘does not need nuclear weapons; only those who want to solve all problems by force do.’”

Still, in 2004, the Bush Administration attempted to use the Natanz and Arak revelations to refer Iran’s case from IAEA to UN Security Council. These efforts were unfruitful, so the Bush Administration relied on the EU to negotiate with Iran. President Ahmadinejad’s fiery speech before the UN General Assembly on September 17, 2005 — mentioning a “nuclear apartheid” and insisting that Iran would develop fuel-cycle technology regardless of the West’s concerns brought the confrontation to a boil with the western countries. On September 24, 2005, the IAEA board of governors found Iran in violation of the NPT and voted to report it to the Security Council. Thanks to the new government’s undiplomatic approach, the decision marked the end of years of calculated efforts to avoid referral to the Security Council. President Ahmadinejad stated, “retreating by even an iota in this [nuclear] path is out of the question. We had the revolution in order not to listen [to the West]. And again, nuclear technology is not something someone gave us so they can take it back; no one can take it back.” Nonetheless, since 2002, the United States has been using diplomacy and politics by utilizing the UN, the IAEA, the EU and possibly NATO in order to prevent Iran from producing nuclear weapons.

As noted above, the Bush Administration entrusted the task of resolving the Iran nuclear issue over to the EU, which before 2002 did not seem to have a serious concern about Iran’s nuclear programme. However, in October 2002, after the revelations of the two clandestine nuclear locations in Iran, the Foreign Ministers of the three leading EU members, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, began visiting Iran and have met with Iranian officials periodically to sort out a workable agreement.


14 These and other similar views were expressed by many Iranians during the Nuclear Technologies conference in Tehran on 5–6 March 2005. The most elaborate explanations came from Ambassador A.A. Soltanieh, Deputy Director General for International Affairs at the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in charge of devising Iran’s nuclear diplomacy.

15 “Iran’s President — His Own Words,” BBC News, January 16, 2006.
In November 2004, negotiations between Iran and the EU were concluded with the Paris Agreement. With this agreement, the Iranian government agreed, voluntarily, to suspend its uranium enrichment. However, this initiative was labeled a ‘waste of time’ by the Bush Administration, concluding that the EU was allowing time for Iran to enrich uranium. By 2005, Iran had restarted its uranium enrichment in Esfahan. On August 1, 2005, Britain, Germany and France offered a “package” of incentives, including their own security assurances, further economic cooperation, and a guaranteed supply of fuel for electricity reactors. On the other hand, in exchange, Iran would have to give up permanently production of fissile material used in nuclear weapons. The Tehran government immediately rejected the so-called “implementation document”. The French foreign minister, Philippe Douste-Blaz expressed his concerns in the bluntest terms: “It’s very simple: No civilian nuclear plan can explain Iran’s nuclear program. Therefore, it’s a clandestine military program.” 17 Expressing similar sentiments, Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, said, “We must prevent Iran from developing its nuclear activities”. 18

In March 2005, Sirus Naseri, an Iranian negotiator, commented, “Now that we can produce our own nuclear fuel, to give it up and rely on others to provide it would be ludicrous.” He then asked, “Would the United States do it? Or France, Germany, Britain, or the Netherlands?” The Tehran government was simply unwilling to give up Iran’s right, under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to have enrichment technology for peaceful purposes and has offered to allow the IAEA to monitor their facilities around the clock to ensure that its activities do not move toward nuclear weapons”.

Some analysts like Tom Sauer believe that 2002 was a turning point for EU because it has had the ambition to become a main global player. 19 By mediating between the U.S. and Iran, the EU could establish their centrality in global affairs by solving one of the key issues in the world. It is also undeniable that EU has had economical interest in Iran. According to Reza Simber, the EU’s strategy of preferring diplomacy has been influenced by the attractiveness of "Iranian oil, 20 the large market it offers, and its strategic location in the Persian Gulf and as a gateway for natural resources from Central Asian countries.” According to Wyn Bowen and Joanna Kidd, although the EU has been critical about Iran’s human rights record, support given to terrorist activities and its nuclear programme, the union has aimed at improving Iranian behavior through diplomatic coercion. 21

The other key player that both the U.S. and EU as well as Iran have depended on, is the non-state entity the IAEA. In 1995, a Russian deal with Iran called for supplying the Bushehr plant with nuclear fuel for ten years. This required Iran to allow the IAEA to monitor and establish

---

18 Iran Times (Washington), February 10, 2006.
19 Tom Sauer, Coercive diplomacy by the EU: the Iranian nuclear weapons crisis, Apr, 2007
safeguard protocols. After the revelations of two secret locations in Natanz and Arak in February 2003, the IAEA inspectors visited Tehran to examine all nuclear facilities for an extended period. As noted above, the IAEA reported that there were no nuclear arms activities. Then, in December 2003, Iran signed the Additional Protocol to the NPT, which allowed unannounced inspections by IAEA agents. Nevertheless, on September 24, 2005, the IAEA board of governors announced that Iran was in violation of the NPT and voted to report the case to the Security Council, ending Iran’s efforts to prevent such an action. In January 2006 the IAEA reported evidence suggesting a link between Iran’s officially peaceful nuclear-research program and its military work on high explosives and missiles under the so-called Green Salt Project.22 On February 4, 2006, a majority of the governing board of the IAEA decided to report Iran’s 16 specific NPT violations to the Security Council. Additionally, on November 2009, IAEA noted with serious concerns that Iran continued to defy the requirement and obligation with regard to IAEA and UN Security Council.

As the United States, joined by the EU and IAEA, has continually pressed Iran to back away from its nuclear ambitions, two other major players on the international scene have significantly complicated the West’s, and especially the U.S.’s efforts: China and Russia. Where China is concerned, five important factors have come into play: first, upholding the nuclear nonproliferation regime; second, sustaining bilateral energy and economic relationships with Iran; third, protecting relations with the United States; fourth, promoting China’s international image; and fifth, respecting Iran’s right to a civilian nuclear program.

Recently it was discovered that in 1991 China transferred sensitive materials to Iran for enrichment without informing the IAEA, and trained Iranian nuclear technicians. However, most of that assistance had been cancelled since.23 Sustaining positive relations with both Iran and U.S. is one of the China’s main diplomatic ambitions; choosing between Washington and Tehran is not what Chinese government wants. In terms of economic development, the United States is China’s most important partner. In 2009 China’s trade with United States reached 300$ billion vastly greater than the volume of Chinese-Iranian trade.24 On the other hand, the Middle East has been the major source of China’s energy imports. From 1998 to 2010, the Middle East has provided 50.7% of China’s total energy imports. Iran is China’s second largest provider of oil, contributing 15% of the total.25 Hence today China is considered Iran’s top trade partner, with a trade valued at approximately 10 billion dollars per year and China has, certainly in its own economic best interest, decided to invest a large amount of capital Iran’s oil and natural gas industry.26

On October 28, 2004 a 'Memorandum of Understanding' was signed between China and Iran concerning oil and gas. This agreement stated, in exchange for allowing Sinopec to develop Iran's Yadavaran oil field, that China would purchase 10 million tons of oil from Iran annually over the following twenty-five years. After the 'Memorandum of Understanding,' China declared its opposition to addressing the issue of Iran's nuclear programme in the UN Security Council. However, on 4 February 2006 China reversed its position and voted for the referral of Iran's nuclear programme to the UN Security Council.

Chinese leaders have tried to keep the balance between Iran and U.S. and maintain its reliable global image by, sometimes, opposing U.S.-influenced UN Security Council resolutions and, at other times, agreeing on the resolutions against Iran. It is likely that if Iran continues to enrich uranium and violate IAEA’s safeguard standards, that China will not be able to bear the pressure from other states in opposing Iran’s nuclear activities.

Russia has also been an ambivalent player in the continuing tension between the U.S. and Iran. Despite Iran’s post-revolutionary slogan “no east, no west”, in 1986, Iranian leadership resumed the relationship with Russia by signing an economical protocol. Then, in 1989 a major arms deal was reached between the two nations. Between 1990 and 1995 several more arms agreements were signed despite U.S. objections. Eventually, Russia slowed down selling military equipment to Iran by signing the 1995 Gore-Chemomyrdin Pact with the US. However it restarted its activities with Iran a few years later.

The 2002 disclosure of Natanz and Arak’s nuclear plants astonished Russian leaders. In an effort to forestall international crisis, Russia offered to enter into a joint venture with Iran to enrich uranium in its own nuclear plants and then send it to Isfahan and Natanz nuclear plants in Iran. This would prevent Iran from utilizing nuclear enrichment on its own soil for a clandestine nuclear weapons program while still permitting the Iranians to pursue peaceful nuclear activities. There were two key points in this proposal that help to explain Russia’s flirting with a conflict with the U.S. over such assistance. First, Iran would be obliged to buy uranium at a relatively high price from Russia and therefore it would be economically dependent on Russia. Second, over 300 Russian companies would participate in the Bushehr project, therefore promoting domestic Russian industries improving its internal economy and having a positive impact on the Russian employment rate. Since the beginning of the post-Cold War period, Tehran and Moscow have signed an arms trade and cooperation agreement (1992) for the construction of a nuclear power plant in Iran. Henceforth, as Vladimir Orlov and Alexander Vinnikov stated “Nuclear cooperation would consist of constructing nuclear power plants for Iran, cycling nuclear fuel, supplying research reactors, reprocessing spent fuel, producing isotopes for use in scientific and medical research and training Iranian nuclear scientists at the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute”.

The U.S. and its supporters have opposed assistance with Iran’s nuclear program. As noted by Orlov and Vinnikov:

“Since the mid-1990s, Russia had featured in virtually every mention of Iran's nuclear programme. Indeed, Russia is the only state to have openly cooperated with Iran in the nuclear field and has spent the better part of the last decade at the receiving end of fierce US criticism for its efforts”.

Interestingly, the United States has agreed to a Turkish proposal to have France build nuclear power plants in Iran, but it has been strongly opposed to the Russian construction of nuclear power plants in Bushehr, adding to the multiple tensions concerning U.S. policies and positions.

Some state actors believe that Russian leaders’ two-track diplomacy game has benefited them in several respects. Russia has voted in favor of UN Security Council sanctions against Iran’s nuclear program but has also helped Iran build its nuclear facilities in Bushehr. Like China, Russia has sought to satisfy the demands of international society while continuing to cooperate with Iran and preserving its dominant position in the Iranian nuclear market. Moreover, Russian balances Iran’s increasing regional presence in the Middle East and its geopolitical security considerations. Also, by mediating between Iran and international community, Russia has reinforced its regional and international geopolitical power Russia in the Middle East and Central Asia, restoring some degree of diplomatic parity with the United States that was seemingly undermined with the end of the cold war and collapse of the Soviet Union as the second superpower.

**Conclusion:**

Despite continual disapproval and occasional direct intervention on the part of the United States, the Iranian nuclear situation remains unresolved. Even involvement on the part of two non-government agencies that the U.S. helped to create and over which it exercises significant influence, the UN Security Council and the IAEA, and that of the U.S.’s biggest ally, the EU, has not brought the situation to an end. What does this entire scenario regarding Iran’s nuclear program reflect on global governance and globalization?

First, in the post Cold War era of globalization, key international issues cannot be treated unilaterally. The EU-3, Russia, China and the U.S have been discussing Iran’ nuclear program for eight years. Other countries such as Turkey and Brazil have offered solutions as well. Although only a few states in the world can decide on this issue, they have to reach a common agreement to pass a resolution. They cannot take actions unilaterally without considering other major states’ views into account.

Second, security appears to be second to economic and geopolitical interests on the part of key players. In other words, Iran’s nuclear threat is not yet considered a jeopardizing factor for global security. Although, Iran’s strong motivations to obtain nuclear power along with the revelations of clandestine nuclear facilities in Natanz and Arak, in addition to violations of IAEA safeguard standards has left no doubt on the part of other states that Iran is seeking nuclear

---

31 Ibid., 49.
weapon, yet China, Russia and the EU-3 pursue their economic and geopolitical priorities rather than stopping Iran before it is too late. Despite U.S. pressure, Russia has not ceased its nuclear and economic trade with Iran. China continues to import 15% of its energy resources from Iran. The EU’s imports 90% of its energy and energy related products from Iran, amounting to $11.3 billion. Conversely, the EU’s exports to Iran in 2008 were mainly machinery and transport equipment (54.6%), manufactured goods (16.9%) and chemicals (12.1%) reaching $14.1 billion (ECT 2009). On the other hand, Russia, China, and the EU maintain obviously a greater economic partnership with the United States than does Iran. As a result, whenever there is more pressure from the United States, they tend to listen to the U.S., going at least so far as signing UN Security Council resolutions against Iran. Thus it appears that their economic and geopolitical interests outweigh global security.

Third, obtaining legitimacy in era of globalization is an increasingly essential issue, especially after the Bush Administration’s attack on Iraq. Although the United States is absolutely certain that Iran is aiming at nuclear weapon, it is constrained by the necessity of obtaining legitimacy from other major states before imposing any sanctions or taking action on a global scale. The EU’s attempts at applying diplomacy and China and Russia’s frequent vetoes have postponed the U.S. efforts to block Iran from getting nuclear weapons.

Fourth, although small unions of states in the Middle East and regionalization in general on the part of Middle Eastern states is growing, these are still not viable enough to have a noticeable role in global governance and key decision-making. For the time being, outside nations whose economic, geopolitical, and security concerns involve them with Iran’s nuclear policy will dominate the conversation.

Finally, as a non-state actors, the IAEA and the UN, play two continuing important and complicating roles. They can be considered both barriers and facilitators for the states. It takes considerable amount of time for 5 members of Security Council to agree on imposing new sanctions on Iran. Nevertheless, IAEA can help the United States and countries who desire to prevent Iran’s nuclear activities by monitoring Iran nuclear activities or providing evidences if Iran violates the rules in order to block Iran from reaching nuclear weapons.

Due to different geopolitical interests of major states, legitimacy issues and Iran’s threat of counter-attack on Israel, the world is not ready to take military action against Iran. Moreover, the current sanctions will not block Iran’s motivation to obtain nuclear weapon. Iran will be forced to stop uranium enrichment if the major importers and exporters of Iran’s energy resources and nuclear facilities including Russia, China and EU ban Iranian exports and imports entirely, but that is an impossible solution to imagine. The second approach is that United States might wait and help with to encourage governmental change within Iran seems more realistic and likely to happen. The second approach will occur sooner or later because 1) Iran cannot withstand globalization and the free market without changing its domestic structure. As the secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice stated, “We may face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran whose policies would be 180 degrees different than the Middle East we would like to see developed.” (16) 2) human rights violations are not tolerable to the public anymore. However, this governmental change might happen in an Iran that is the 10th nuclear power or before it reaches that capability.
References:


Nilufar Zahra, “attitudes of international community toward Iran’s nuclear puzzle”, 2008


